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Spinoza Now is an important addition to a new strand of literature on philosopher 
Baruch Spinoza: one that seeks to examine the significance of his thought beyond the 
philosophy classroom. It is a strong collection of essays that are individually thought-
provoking and collectively coherent, giving the widest possible overview of the 
interesting work being done on Spinoza today. Though dealing with different 
subjects, and written from different disciplines, thematic similarities emerge that 
encourage us to see Spinoza in a different light: as a philosopher with whom new and 
exciting things can be done. Indeed, the guiding question of the book might be ‘what 
can we do with Spinoza?’ 
 
Spinoza Now is therefore a very different anthology from, say, The Cambridge 
Companion to Spinoza. There is no editorial obligation to cover Spinoza’s various 
works or the key concepts studied on undergraduate courses. Little context or 
explanation of Spinoza’s terms or arguments is provided. It is, instead, a book of 
experiments: its fourteen authors have been given the freedom to use the same core 
material – Spinoza’s metaphysical, epistemological, ethical and political writings – to 
try new combinations of thought. Inevitably the results are somewhat mixed. Some 
chapters are fully worked-out arguments whereas others appear more speculative; 
some leave us with new ways of thinking, whereas others fail to achieve the 
hypothesized results. I do not think this unevenness is necessarily a weakness, for it 
reflects the spirit and method of the book. The papers have been well chosen by 
Vardoulakis, avoiding repetition and over-representation by political themes (always a 
danger in Spinoza collections). The book includes new essays by some major figures 
(Alain Badiou, Warren Montag, and Antonio Negri) alongside those by established 
and less-established scholars, organized into four parts: ‘Strategies for Reading 
Spinoza’; ‘Politics, Theology, and Interpretation’; ‘Spinoza and the Arts’; and 
‘Encounters about Life and Death’. 
 
In Part I, the opening chapter by Christopher Norris is an excellent paper on the 
history of conflicting interpretations of Spinoza. It nicely sets the tone for the volume 
by asking whether there is something about Spinoza’s philosophy that lends itself to 
multiple, often competing, interpretations. Badiou’s chapter, ‘What is a Proof in 
Spinoza’s Ethics?’, immerses us in the geometry of Spinoza’s demonstrations. 
Providing a ‘skeleton’ diagram of Ethics I P28, he reveals the network of earlier 
proofs ‘immanent’ to it. Badiou (who has apparently constructed many such diagrams 
for the proofs of the Ethics) claims that the extent of a proof’s skeleton is a measure 
of its complexity, but this is not so; some of Spinoza’s most complex ideas are proved 
most simply (Ethics II P7, the thesis of parallelism, for instance, which refers back 
only to one axiom). The notion that the geometrical complexity of a proof relates to 
its power is intriguing, but Badiou does not do enough to elaborate it here. 
 
A highlight of the collection is Justin Clemens’ brilliant piece on ‘Spinoza’s Ass’. 
Clemens looks at the paradox of Buridan’s ass – an animal that cannot choose 
between alternatives of food and water placed at equal distances – and Spinoza’s 
dismissal of the ‘problems of decision’ usually associated with it. With impressive 
research, Clemens traces the paradox through its philosophical and economic uses, 
and finds in Spinoza’s discussion of it a new dimension: Buridan’s ass is brought out 
at Ethics II P49S to criticize not only Descartes’ theory of the will, but also Hobbes’ 
position on sovereignty. While I was unconvinced by Clemens’ insistence on the 
political significance of the paradox, I hugely admired his attempt to persuade me of 
it. This is Spinoza scholarship of the most creative kind. 
 
Part II opens with Michael Mack defending the thesis that Spinoza provides the basis 
for a ‘non-hierarchical and non-exclusive understanding of human sociability’ 
(p.100). Laudable though this sentiment is, it seems to me to ignore the Nietzschean 
side of Spinoza’s thought: the side that promotes power and its increase. Mack’s 
argument depends on his claim that any position that is pro-hierarchical is necessarily 
pro-teleological as well, and while I do not dispute that historically philosophers 
adhering to the first position have tended also to hold to the second, there is no 
necessary connection between them. Nor do I understand why Mack believes 
teleology leads necessarily to discrimination, exploitation and violence. Spinoza may 
be pro-hierarchical and anti-teleological (though plenty of critics have found a 
teleological thread in his work); none of it means he must be in favour of exploitation. 
These are interesting and complicated questions for Spinoza which needed to be 
thought through a little further. 
 
The centrepiece of the book, whether intentionally or not, is Cesare Casarino’s ‘Marx 
Before Spinoza: Notes toward an Investigation’. The editor has been far too generous 
with the word limit here: the essay (38 pages long, followed by a staggering 17 pages 
of endnotes) is twice as long as any other in the book, and is badly unfocused. 
Complex discussion of Deleuze’s notion of sense struggles for prominence against the 
paper’s central argument that ‘it is impossible to make sense of Spinoza without 
making sense first of Marx’ (p.179). The latter claim would have been interesting had 
it been properly considered. What it amounts to here is a messy argument that the 
‘connectedness of all things’, which for Marx characterizes capitalism, is the 
precondition for Spinoza’s ‘concatenation of all being’ in substance – suggesting that 
Spinoza’s Ethics could have been written only in a capitalist society. Well, maybe. 
But what is to be gained from this reduction of a philosophical system to the 
economic circumstances of its genesis? For Casarino, it seems to be the conclusion 
that Spinoza is an ‘anti-capitalist thinker’. This is evidenced, he claims, by Spinoza’s 
remarks that accumulating wealth for its own sake is ethically bad. But this view does 
not entail a critique of capitalism. Spinoza’s belief that wealth is not an end in itself 
was shared not only by Aristotle and the Stoics, but also by his capitalist neighbours, 
who would have wholeheartedly affirmed the Christian doctrine that the love of 
money is the root of all evil. Castigating the love of money turns out not to contradict 
the drive to profit: the lack of a contradiction here is just what makes capitalism so 
interesting, and its lifelong partnership with Protestantism so plausible. If Spinoza is 
an anti-capitalist thinker (and again, I do not think it is obvious that he is), we should 
find evidence for that in his critique of the ways theology, politics, and economics are 
themselves ‘concatenated’. Casarino misses this, and thus misses both what is so 
interesting about capitalism and what is so interesting about making it the context for 
Spinoza’s thought. 
 
Part III is an especially welcome inclusion since, following the dominant view that 
Spinoza has nothing to say about art and aesthetics, very little has been written about 
it. That there are things to say about Spinoza and art emerges from these three 
chapters. The first, by Sebastian Egenhofer, is on Thomas Hirschhorn’s 1999 Spinoza 
Monument. I did not get along with the style of this essay, but I am glad to see an art 
theorist writing about this piece. I would gladly have read a longer paper by Anthony 
Uhlmann, whose ten-page essay ‘Spinoza, Ratiocination, and Art’, while somewhat 
impressionistic, reveals great depth of thought about its subject. Taking relation to be 
the point of contact between Spinoza and the arts, he makes an intriguing case for 
relation, ratio and proportion as inhabiting thought itself. 
 
An essay about Rembrandt and Spinoza, by Mieke Bal and Dimitris Vardoulakis, had 
great potential but was marred by the imprecise and obfuscating language of cultural 
studies. Take, for instance, the sentences that state the paper’s argument:  
 
Interruption, as a concept and as a praxis, could be used to broach the 
relation between Rembrandt and Spinoza. In that case, the 
impossibility of their relation would be nothing more – and nothing 
less – than the impossible unity between philosophical contemplation 
and artistic endeavour, the discontinuous relation between the realm of 
essences and the plane of existence. But then, their relation will not be 
impossible in any simple sense any longer; rather it will be 
(im)possible, a possibility that cannot be simply stated (p.279). 
 
Now, I am used to reading the difficult specialist language and grammatical 
constructions of continental philosophy. I happily read Derrida and Deleuze, and 
would defend their style against the complaints of those who demand that 
philosophers speak plainly. But the quoted passage is just incoherent, and it is 
impossible to make any sense of that or the remainder of the essay. Vardoulakis (I 
presume) makes a good effort to argue that art, for Spinoza, distinguishes existence 
from essence, but this is conjoined to an unbelievable interpretive reverie on three 
works by Rembrandt (presumably by Bal). How these two halves are supposed to 
relate is not at all clear, and not in the positive sense of ‘discontinuous relation’ that 
perhaps the authors intended. This was disappointing. 
 
By contrast, in Part IV, A. Kiarina Kordela’s chapter ‘A Thought beyond Dualisms, 
Creationist and Evolutionist alike’, is a joy to read. It is a strong, well-argued, and 
admirably clear essay that goes against the grain of the recent Spinoza scholarship 
that takes his thought to be purely life-affirming. Kordela argues instead that 
Spinoza’s thought involves an intertwining of life and death, and uses the tools of 
psychoanalytical philosophy to show how. I enjoyed her criticism of Damasio’s claim 
that Spinoza inverts Cartesian dualism and his argument for a Spinozistic 
evolutionism. I admired her sophisticated and provocative argument for the co-
necessity of the death drive and the pleasure principle in Spinoza’s thought. Kordela’s 
chapter was completely refreshing, and actually made me think differently about 
Spinoza. She also provides one of the most compelling interpretations of Spinoza’s 
concept of eternity that I have ever come across. I look forward to reading her much-
acclaimed book $urplus: Spinoza, Lacan.  
 
It is not possible for me to discuss all fourteen chapters here. I have not mentioned 
Simon Duffy on the joyful passions, Arthur Jacobson on Prophecy in Spinoza and 
Maimonides, or Alexander García Düttmann on Spinoza and Derrida. Nor have I 
discussed Montag’s or Negri’s contributions, new essays which will be eagerly read 
by their fans. I must note that out of fourteen essays, only one and a half are by 
women. Given all the good Spinoza scholars out there who happen to be female, this 
is a great shame. 
 
Despite the low points that I have noted, I found this book to be a very exciting 
addition to the literature on Spinoza. Readers of Spinoza in any discipline will find 
something of interest here, and I would not hesitate to recommend some of these 
essays to students, who are often especially curious about Spinoza’s outward and 
interdisciplinary connections. The chapters vary in their accessibility, and few are 
suited to readers coming to Spinoza (or to philosophy) for the first time. Most are 
rooted in the traditions of continental philosophy and its adjunct disciplines: 
continental philosophy of literature, law, politics, and so on. But for readers in those 
disciplines, and those who know and like Spinoza and want to see what can be done 
with his thought, this book is a great starting point. Order this for your library, and 
browse with joy. 
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